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This chapter opens up a number of questions
regarding human and non-human relations. The
focus is on landscape practices, which shape and
are shaped by those relations. In the first half, I
review some of the main ways in which geo-
graphers have dealt with the relationships
between landscapes and nature. Simplifying, I
divide these approaches into landscape tectonics
and landscape semiotics. Finding resources in
both ‘traditions’, I argue in the second half that
there are ways of engaging with landscapes and
natures that refuse to see either as pure culture
(the nature of no nature) or as raw matter (the
nature of nature). The intention is to avoid any
understanding of nature that reduces ‘it’ to primary
(or for that matter secondary) properties (a tactic
I will refer to pejoratively as a first nature
politics) and yet, at the same time, to refuse to
obliterate spaces of nature by reading all
instances of human/non-human relations as
somehow culturally determined. In some ways
following Castree (Chapter 8, this volume), I
argue that avoiding the classic pitfalls of natural
and/or cultural determinism requires something
more than an analytical imagination. Therefore,
in the latter parts of the chapter, I review a
number of approaches which attempt to inhabit
landscapes as living relations, with all their dif-
ferences, continuities, discontinuities and entan-
gled formations. I look for various possibilities
in cultural geography and its surroundings,
including science studies, feminist theory and
poststructuralism, for developing a sensitized
geography of landscapes and natures. Rather
than fixing the terms, the goal becomes one of
finding ways of understanding landscape, nature
and inhabitation that are experimental and poten-
tially creative.
By way of background, it is useful to dwell
upon the importance of arguing for change in
the ways in which landscapes and natures are
understood. To caricature a conventional argu-
ment, as things currently stand, people, land-
scapes and natures are ‘out of joint’. And in
conventional environmental politics, this tends
to mean that somewhere and at some point in the
dark past of urban-industrial society, the joins
between people and their environments have
been ruptured. The implicit and sometimes
explicit aim is to rejoin the worlds of culture,
economy and humans with the already consti-
tuted worlds of nature, ecology and non-humans.
Such views can be found in certain versions of
bioregionalism (although see McGinnis, 1999,
for a range of bioregional writing) and in a variety
of environmentalisms (see Dobson, 1990). I want
to avoid such a judgement in this chapter, and
steer clear of a politics and an ethics which found
themselves on a universal first nature (or even
imagine a universalized second nature upon
which to build an unchanging ethical system).
Yet, at the same time, there is something about
being out of joint which can present the possibility
for new forms of environmental politics.
Indeed, the sense of being out of joint that I
want to pursue in this chapter is one which
invites attempts to make new articulations, to
experiment with connections. That these
attempts cannot be made solely on the basis of
human volition starts to open up what a politics
of inhabitation might involve. Inhabiting is a
more than human affair. Equally, inhabitation is
not simply a matter of adding in non-humans.
Indeed, this is not about ‘social interactions
between already constituted objects’ (Rajchman,
2000: 12), be they human, non-human or any other
segmented identity. As such this is not simply
about representing landscaping elements or speak-
ing of and for others. A politics of representation
can only be, if anything, the imperfect start to a
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politics of inhabitation. More schematically, the
argument pursued here relies on two forms of
politics.
First, there is a politics of representation: there
is a politics of recovery with which to be
engaged. There are cultural geographies of land-
scaping to be written which engage in a different
politics of representation – a politics that takes
the presences and performances of humans and
non-humans of all kinds, shapes and sizes as
matters of potential importance. Second, there is
a politics of inhabitation: more than an attempt to
restock the pages of cultural geography with the
missing masses, there is another, less obviously
liberal democratic, motive at work. This is not
simply a matter of a liberation of the oppressed
(or even return of the repressed), although such a
politics is far from redundant. It is also a matter
of experimenting with styles of inhabiting, styles
that manage to re-cover and re-cognize without
covering over everything (inventing itself as a
final vocabulary), or imagining that cognition
is a matter only for human minds and human
minds alone.
The politics of representation and of inhabita-
tion that inform this chapter are, then, neither
mutually exclusive nor in competition. Neverthe-
less, one of the main aims is to open up a land-
scape and nature geography that is aware of the
limits to representation, and is thereby sensitized
to the orders and indeterminacies that are
involved in inhabiting. I start with the practices
and meanings of ‘landscape’ as they have
worked themselves through in cultural geo-
graphy, relating these specifically to the repre-





Tectonics: the study of the building of
landscape form
Landscape tectonics, in the sense I use it here, is
crudely summarized as the material building of
landscape. One particularly influential strand to
this approach has been Carl Sauer’s (1925; 1966)
writing on the cultural and material shaping of
landform and landscape. At its best, this work
foregrounds the ways in which landscaping is
always a coproduction – involving humans
(cultures) and non-humans (natures). Whilst
Sauer’s earlier work tended to presuppose a
pre-human landscape which was processed by
various waves of human occupants, his later
work on cultural landscapes managed to success-
fully dispel those representations of American
wilderness as devoid of cultural production (the
narrative basis for various forms of colonization,
including, more lately, colonization performed
through the exclusionary practices of natural
landscape conservation: see Escobar, 1995;
Wilson, 1992). Indeed, Sauer and his followers
have been particularly successful in providing a
counterpoint to those understandings of land-
scape that seek to derive normative value from a
myth of pre-human natural purity. Nevertheless,
a strong nostalgia for the ‘natural’, maintained
for example through the Sauer-influenced volume
Man’s Role in Changing the Face of the Earth
(Thomas, 1956), seemed to underscore a fairly
robust sense of a division between cultures and
nature, or, at the very least, between naturalized
(pure and unified) versions of culture and those
problematic modern versions of industrialized,
urbanized society. The tendency has been, there-
fore, to treat the process of landscape formation
as the result of interactions between natural and
cultural processes – both of which tended to be
portrayed as somehow definable in, and through,
the absence of the other (Figure 10.1).
As Demeritt (1994a) demonstrates, the inheri-
tors of this ‘interactive’ version of landscape
tectonics include the wave of landscape and
environmental historians writing in the 1980s
and 1990s. These writers, partly provoked by a
growing environmentalist critique of modern
society, sought to recover ‘the earth itself’
(Worster, 1988: 289) as a vital and autonomous
component of landscape evolution. For Worster,
all landscapes are the result of interactions
between nature and culture (1990: 1144), and
any account that denies one or the other will fail
to represent the full tectonics of landscape. In
one sense, Worster is surely right to unsettle
assumptions of humans as sole agents in the
making of landscape and environmental histories.
The main danger is, however, that the physical
world he evokes resembles a universal, timeless
and spaceless nature whose primary properties
can be revealed or derived (Demeritt, 1994a; see
also Demeritt, 1994b; and the reply from
Cronon, 1994).
The result is politically fragile. The combina-
tion of a concern for non-human nature which at
one and the same time is included in landscape
accounts but also is ‘naturalized’ (that is,
extracted from the histories and geographies of
worldly affairs) is a strategy that buys political
time but at a cost which is more than a matter
for academic pedantry alone. For example, the
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prehistorical first nature that inhabits Cronon’s
(1991) writing of Chicago (if not his later
collective work, see Cronon, 1996, or even
his introduction to Nature’s Metropolis) is
informed by bio-energetics and a trophic-
dynamic model of ecosystems – which are
themselves wrapped up in a broad political
nexus (see Demeritt, 1994a). So much so that
Demeritt quite rightly questions the degree to
which this first nature exists as ontologically
prior to human history:
Ecosystem ecology got its start as radiation ecology,
but the insistent press of the outside world upon the
modern science of ecology hardly stops there. Integral
to the metaphor of ecosystem are cybernetics, the
mathematics of command and control, first developed
to control automatic anti-aircraft guns and now used to
guide the US Navy’s Cruise missiles and the automatic
trading program of institutional commodities bankers.
(1994a: 177)
This is, it is important to add, not to say that this
science is necessarily flawed, nor is it to say that
another acultural position or god-like viewing
platform is possible (see Haraway, 1991).
Rather, it is to say that the natures that we (possi-
bly rightly) want to include in landscape histories
and geographies are unlikely to be innocent. Nor
are they likely to be accessible as a set of
unmediated (or even mediated) primary properties
(a matter to which I will return). To be sure,
‘INHABITING’: LANDSCAPES AND NATURES 209
Figure 10.1 Alan Sonfist, ‘Time Landscape’
3029-ch10.qxd  6/5/02 9:00 PM  Page 209
Cronon is well aware of the need to avoid this
universal nature at the same time as wanting to
hold onto the political project of environmental
history. For example, Cronon is well aware of
the limitations of Clementsian climax ecology,
with its projection of balance and harmony onto
the external, natural world (see Cronon, 1996,
and the chapter by Barbour, 1996, in the same
volume). Nevertheless, and despite some exem-
plary writings in this field, there remains a
nagging doubt that environmental and landscape
historians have not yet provided a means of
engaging with the natures of landscape which
avoids either smothering them in cultural
processes or allocating to them first-order, time-
less and spaceless properties. For the most part,
and despite the best of intentions, their accounts
tend only to delay the moment when a natural-
ized universal nature reenters the story.
The practical and political reasons for rejecting
any recourse to first nature are amply demon-
strated in some of the more recent work on
environmental and landscape histories that is
emerging from studies in political ecology and
new biogeographies (see Fairhead and Leach,
1998; Moore, 1996; Zimmerer, 2000). For example,
through a wonderfully detailed and thorough
study of forestry practices in several West African
nation-states, Fairhead and Leach argue that:
Not only did the development of scientific ideas about
West African forests have its own complex intellectual
history and sociology, in which certain theories or
debates were able to rise to the exclusion of others. But
also, and crucially, these views dovetailed with the
administrative and political concerns of the institutions
with which they co-evolved in a process of mutual
shaping. Ideas about forest-climate equilibria, or the
functioning of relatively stable forest ecosystems, for
instance, fed directly into a conceptual framework and
set of scientific practices for conservation, which was
about external control. (1998: 189)
The result of this ‘ecology of understanding’
produced what Fairhead and Leach identify as a
simplification and homogenization of forestry
knowledge. It led to the valorization of a first
nature (an ecological bottom line) which itself
contributed to an oversimplified account of
deforestation. Critically, and as a result, ‘the
complex, unexpected social and ecological
dynamic’ (1998: 190) of living forests remained
outside authorized understandings. A rather puri-
fied, natural systems model of forest dynamics
formed the yardstick against which social systems
of forestry practice were, normally unfavourably,
measured. This exclusion of human/non-human
relations from ecological understanding of defor-
estation and aforestation practices resulted in a
tendency to treat people living in forest zones as
strangers (see also Hecht and Cockburn, 1989).
Not only that, they were also to become unwel-
come strangers in a land where ‘“nature” and its
national and international guardians have come
to claim a right’ (Fairhead and Leach, 1998:
192). It should be noted that denouncing this
external authority of modern environmental
conservation discourse and instead celebrating
flux and dynamism is a risky venture. Whilst
Fairhead and Leach point towards a form of
participatory pluralism which recognizes the
importance of power relations in the making of
landscapes, others adopt a language that seems
to echo the hyperbole of laissez-faire market
capitalists (see Stott, 1998).
Even the growing level of awareness regard-
ing the political and ecological importance of
participatory forms of landscape management
has, by and large, failed to dislodge the basic
foundations and authority of this first nature
politics. Participation becomes, in many cases, a
means of meeting what are preset expert goals
and objectives (for a parallel example in UK
nature conservation practice, see Goodwin,
1998). Or else, it becomes a means to order people
and practices in terms of their naturalness, their
conservation compatibility (Zimmerer, 2000:
357), or their suitability as timeless guardians of
a timeless first or second nature (see Ingold and
Kurttila, 2000, for a more developed argument
concerning the dynamics of knowledge and
practice, focusing in their case on Finnish
landscapes).
Fairhead and Leach start to develop an unset-
tling of the natures and cultures that make up
forest and savanna zone landscapes in West
Africa. Following earlier work by Hawthorne
(1996), forest landscapes are understood no
longer as intricately balanced and likely to fall
apart at the slightest disruption, but as ‘an ad hoc
assemblage of species thriving after millennia of
disturbance’ (Fairhead and Leach, 1998: 185).
What starts to emerge is a sense of living land-
scapes which cannot be reduced to either a pre-
existing culture or a pre-exiting nature. These
landscapes are not solely about interactions of an
already constituted nature and a culture which
somehow can be defined in the absence of its
human/non-human relations. Rather, Fairhead
and Leach start to point to a coproduction of
landscapes, cultures and natures. To be sure, the
theoretical delicacies of this achievement are of
little concern to Fairhead and Leach. But, in
order for them to be able to imagine alternative
accounts, the authors reach beyond Sauerian
landscape history (a tradition to which they never-
theless explicitly see themselves as belonging) to
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a second set of general responses to the landscape
question. As the title of their book, Reframing
Deforestation, suggests, landscape is not only a
tectonic affair, it is also a way of seeing and a
matter for semiotics. It is to these approaches
that I will now turn.
Semiotics: the study of the building of
landscape meanings
If ‘nature’, and for that matter ‘culture’, tended
to be treated as unproblematic matters in land-
scape history and cultural ecology, then no such
comfort was available to geographers in this
second tradition. Landscape, as object or form,
was turned into one, among many, ‘ways of see-
ing’ (see Berger, 1972) and, in other cases, as
one among a number of possible textual inscrip-
tions and descriptions of meaning. In what is
now a familiar and well-worn critique of the
Sauerian approach to landscape form, geographers
who have sought to denaturalize landscape as a
way of seeing have highlighted a tendency to
uncritically adopt what was a historically and
geographically specific approach to the study of
landscape.1 Meanwhile, those geographers who
have explored landscape-as-text metaphors have
similarly highlighted the historical, political and
cultural means through which landscapes are
written and read (see Duncan, 1995). In the
following I treat both traditions as examples of
attempts to interpret landscapes, their production
and their reproduction. The focus, again, is on
the spaces of nature that these analyses allow for
or produce.
Mitchell’s identification of what he terms an
‘encounter’ way of seeing in the landscape and
environmental narratives of the ‘new western
history’ is a recent example of an approach to
landscape interpretation which reflects upon the
role of visual subjects:
[R]epresentations of landscape are bound with a
particular ‘way of seeing’ the landscape that under-
stands it to be something always already there, some-
thing simply to be encountered (rather than actively
constructed). (1998: 9, emphasis added)
Given the conflicts that mark North American
colonial history and geography, it is possibly
even more surprising that here a tradition of
treating landscape as ‘matter of fact’, a pre-existing
object, is retained. For, as Mitchell attests, ‘the
“West” is an image of landscape so freighted
with political meaning (not to mention more than
150 years of popular iconography) that the real
places upon which those images have been built
scarcely seem to matter’ (1998: 12). I will return
in some detail to Mitchell’s ‘real places’ later in
this section. For the moment I will dwell on this
‘encountering’ of landscape as an unproblema-
tized field of vision in order to draw out some
of its implications for human and non-human
living.
It was largely in terms of a negative response
to the treatment of landscape as a ‘timeless unity
of form’ (Cosgrove, 1984: 16), and through a
positive reading of a wide body of writing in
cultural studies, film theory and art criticism,
that cultural geographers turned to ‘interpret
landscape not as a material consequence of inter-
actions between a society and an environment,
observable in the field by the more or less objec-
tive gaze of the geographer, but rather as a gaze
which itself helps to make sense of a particular
relationship between society and land’ (Rose,
1993: 87). More than simply material relation-
ships of society and land, landscaping set up
particular modes of observation, worldliness and
representation. Drawing on Law and Benschop’s
(1997) summary of the kinds of relationships
that were in part constituted through the Renais-
sance humanism of fifteenth- and sixteenth-
century Italy, these modes can be characterized
in the following ways direct quotes and para-
phrasing from Law and Benschop, 1997: 160–1;
see also Cosgrove, 1985):
1 The observer
• is a point (constituted by the rules of
perspective) at which matters are drawn 
together (a coherent point and a point of 
coherence)
• is a point that is not included in the 
world it observes
• is a point which is to some extent in a 
relationship of control with the world 
(depictions can be rearranged to re-present
other worlds).
2 Meanwhile, the world
• is separate from the observer
• is a volume containing objects and
is three-dimensional and Euclidean in 
character
• exists prior to its depiction, awaiting
discovery
• contains discrete objects which pass 
through time with significant stability or 
differences, the latter of which are explic-
able in terms of determinable object inter-
actions, collisions etc.
• has a need for narrative, for stories that 
illuminate the character and displacement 
of objects in the world.
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3 Finally, representation
• is illustrative: the world and its narratives 
are already in existence, they simply 
require depiction.
Whilst there are subtle and not so subtle differ-
ences in landscape traditions (between, for exam-
ple, southern and northern European practices:
see Alpers, 1989; Law and Benschop, 1997), it is
possible to suggest that this way of seeing was
intimately associated with two major supposi-
tions. First, the possibility existed for a neat,
centred ‘subject’. Second, an equally neat, though
separate and possibly subordinate, solid ‘object’
could exist. The implications for human/
non-human orders are legion. Cosgrove provides
a useful summary:
Landscape distances us from the world in critical ways,
defining a particular relationship with nature and those
who appear in nature, and offers us the illusion of a
world in which we may participate subjectively by enter-
ing the picture frame along the perspectival axis. But
this is an aesthetic entrance not an active engagement
with a nature or space that has its own life. (1985: 55)
In other words, a settlement or division is per-
formed through the act of framing landscape
(setting up, it could be added, the conditions nec-
essary for an ‘encounter’ way of seeing). The
human subject, or a certain kind of human sub-
ject, is ideally distinguishable from a natural
object. Whilst, as I will take time to demonstrate
later on, this labour of division is always far from
a complete exercise, it nevertheless contributes
to the stabilization of certain relations of power
both between humans and between the human
and non-human worlds (for the former, see
Cosgrove, 1985; Daniels, 1989; Mitchell, 1996;
Rose, 1993; for the latter, see Fitzsimmons,
1988; Hinchliffe, 2000a; Latour, 1993; Whatmore,
1999). The constitution and enfranchizing of
human subjects (and the political meaning of the
term is also relevant), and their estrangement
from human and non-human objects, provide a
setting for a recursive series of purification acts
(see Latour, 1993). To be a good subject (politi-
cally, aesthetically and scientifically) is to be as
distant as possible from the objects upon which
‘he’ gazed. The masculinization of observation
and the feminization (and racialization) of nature
(or the observed) contributed to a way of seeing,
or a modern epistemology, which dovetailed
neatly with a politics of representation (in terms
both of illustration and of suffrage).
To believe that this estrangement occurred, at
some point somewhere, is to accept a form of
modernism – with its sorry (masculine) tale of
inevitable fragmentation and romantic failure.
But narratives of loss should be beside the point.
What is important is the political work that the
practices of seeing can produce (sometimes
aided by the myths of a modern sensibility or
subject). So, for example, certain forms of the
scientific gaze are epistemological practices
which continue to labour aspects of this division
(see Haraway, 1989; Latour, 1993; Stafford,
1993).
A point, of course, of this way of seeing
approach to landscape production is to develop a
form of ideology critique. It is to denaturalize
this encounter, to demonstrate its exclusions and
its artifice. It is to highlight the political distribu-
tions that are performed through the labours of
division between subjects and objects, pure
humans and others, cultures and natures,
observers and observed, scientists and their
experiments (see Law and Benschop, 1997). One
particularly productive means of politicizing
these landscapes has been to focus upon and
historicize the practices of signification that have
contributed to their production. Commenting for
example upon the composition of landscape in
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, and
in particular its systematic placing of agricultural
labour on the background of picturesque rural
countryside, Williams suggests that landscape is
concerned with providing a relationship of
control between the owners and the workers of
land. He goes on to suggest that to landscape is
to distinguish between outside and inside – those
who can project and prospect (the outsiders) and
those who live in the scene (who are therefore
less likely to envision place and space in anything
like the same manner). For Williams, ‘a working
country is hardly ever a landscape. The very idea
of landscape implies separation and observation’
(1973: 120). Williams is undoubtedly overstating
matters here, and I will shortly return to this prob-
lematic division between labouring and viewing,
but the point that landscaping is embroiled within
social relations of ownership, control, property
and a host of temporal and spatial relations, some
of which are neatly evoked by the multiple mean-
ings of the word ‘prospect’, is well made
(Cosgrove, 1985; Hirsch, 1995).
In addition to denaturalizing landscape by
demonstrating its construction as one of a number
of ways of seeing, semiotic approaches really
come into their own when landscape meanings
are understood to be constituted through the
subject’s reading of an arrangement of signs (and
the coincident re-enactment of those meanings
through the actions that they invite and condi-
tion). In this sense, landscape starts to be under-
stood as a textual arrangement of signs (Barnes
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and Duncan, 1992). And the power of the
analytic of the textuality of landscape potentially
resides in its foregrounding of the mutual con-
struction of subjectivities and objectivities (for a
clear treatment, see Curt, 1994). Cues are taken
from a common reading of Foucault which
enables a genealogy of forms to be recon-
structed. Landscapes, like other matters, become
the effects of a myriad of disciplines and delega-
tions. Meanwhile, in case this sounds too much
like a reworking of some form of structural
determinism, subjects are portrayed as involved
in the formulation of landscapes in ways that
allow for a prospective and normative politics of
resistance, play and subversion (Barnes and
Duncan, 1992). Involvement is highlighted for a
reason. The analytical import of textuality is first
and foremost a means to disrupt a world of neat
subjects and objects (without, it should be added,
destroying the possibility of engaging with sub-
jectivities). It is a means to move away from an
analytical style which talks of encounters with
landscape, or which speaks of humans and non-
humans interacting with one another. Rather,
textuality promotes a sense of interpenetrating
subjectivities and objectivities. The collective
subject ‘Beryl Curt’ puts it this way:
The ways in which we ‘experience’ the world are
wrapped up with our concerned engagement with ‘the
world’. The interpenetration is textuality.
Textuality … is an analytic which serves to draw
attention to the impossibility and futility of attempting
to define something (some argument, life or whatever)
as if it were fully self-present and self-sufficient – as if
the world consisted of facts which, as the cliché has it,
‘speak for themselves’. Textuality thus serves to trouble
any arguments founded in the distinction between ‘fact’
and ‘fictions’, the ‘discursive’ and the ‘real’. (1994: 36)
The textuality trick is easier said than done.
Indeed, its utilization in cultural geography has
on occasion managed to unsettle subject/object
divisions, only to draw up a similarly firm dis-
tinction between ‘texts’ and their (intellectual)
readers. Rose was quick to point out what she
defines as an enduring, masculine desire for a
solid looking object of analysis:
The textual metaphor aims to stabilize disruptions
and demonstrate learning and sensitivity: landscape
textualized renders geographers’ knowledge exhaus-
tive. It performs as another example of aesthetic inse-
curity in geography. (1993: 101)
So, even if a large number of subject positions
have been decentred through textuality – which
broadly suggests that they no longer have
the privilege of being the origin or source of
meaning – paradoxically, there remained in
cultural geography a platform on which to stand
and view textual and intertextual landscapes (see
also Burgess, 1990, for an early example of a
geographer’s objection to this form of elitism).
So as Curt, again, insightfully comments (see
also Hinchliffe, 1996, on this analytical ambiva-
lence in technology-as-text metaphors):
The interesting thing is that the words have changed (no
longer is it subject/object, but reader/text) but the
properties and powers attributed along the ‘fault-line’
of the dichotomy have remained the same. (1994: 42)
In short, there has been something of a tendency
to reproduce an ‘us and them’ approach to land-
scape and textuality. This continuing labour of
division (see Cooper, 1997) has been the subject
of various critical interventions from feminist and
Marxist strands of cultural geography. The former
has drawn on psychoanalytical approaches and
visual theory to emphasize the ambivalence
between, and interpenetration of, observer and
observed. So, for example, the ‘pleasure and emo-
tive force which landscapes may provide’ (Nash,
1996: 149; see also Rose, 1993) disrupts any sense
that a pre-formed subject (whether it is the country
landowners of Williams’ ideology critique, or the
landscape geographer) can truly stand, distanced,
from the scene. Landscapes are, then, emotional
and passionate matters, made up of practices that
are just as embodied for the observer as they are
for Williams’ romanticized workers. Rather than
Williams’ insiders and outsiders, we are all land-
scapers now (although the power to landscape and
the powers of landscape remain uneven).
The feminist-inspired critique of the tendency
to objectify the texts themselves starts to remate-
rialize the scene. And much of the remainder of
this chapter draws on this project. But before I
continue in this vein, I need to say something of
the second productive critique of the landscape-
as-text tradition derived from a Marxist-inspired
engagement. If landscape geographers have been
partially successful in decentring the subject
(that point where meaning is reputedly gathered
together), and feminist critiques have focused
upon the tendency to recentre certain kinds of
subjects, then the Marxist critiques have tended
to express a fear of a decentring of the object.
The landscape-as-text metaphor is rightly in
some cases, and wrongly, I would argue, in
others, suspected of dematerializing the world.
The anxiety is generated by an aetherial space of
textuality, ‘a kind of pure cultura’ (Curt, 1994:
25), which requires supplementing with some
form of material production. As an example,
Willems-Braun’s (1997) study engages with the
literary theory of postcolonialism to unpack the
landscaping of the British Columbian forests.
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The extratextual matter of this production of
landscape is made clear in Willems-Braun’s
account of the nineteenth-century geologist
George Dawson’s travel texts (including sur-
veys, diaries, photographs and so on). The latter
are neatly regarded as engaging in a material
framing of the world, one where nature and
native land occupation are disaggregated (a com-
mon trope in the building of colonial and neo-
colonial environmentalisms). But before this
starts to sound as though Dawson was a mind-in-
a-vat (see Latour, 1999b), or that ‘his’ texts were
merely the outcome of a solely linguistic world
of other texts, Willems-Braun rightly draws the
attention to the distributed materiality of land-
scape production:
Dawson’s surveys and journals did not invent objects
and landscapes in flights of fancy. These were material
practices that engaged material worlds. Rather, in
rendering the landscapes visible, the surveys con-
structed from what was encountered an ordered scene
that could be read. Such practices … were not simply
textual, but highly material; they did not leave the land
untouched. Instead they actively displaced and resitu-
ated landscapes within new orders of vision and visibil-
ity, and within regimes of power and knowledge that at
once authorized particular activities and facilitated new
forms of governmentality. (1997: 16, emphasis added)
Willems-Braun neatly argues for a material
approach to cultural production, and advocates
an understanding of the performance of texts in
the material reproduction of landscapes (right up
to the conservationists’ approaches to British
Columbia the following century). However, in its
focus on cultural production, the materiality that
the author evokes never seems to measure up to
much more than a substrate, upon which mean-
ings could be inscribed. If there is agency in
these accounts then it fails to wander very far
from Dawson’s and his successors’ admittedly
material cultures. Nature tends to appear as a
remainder, as something that is encountered,
enrolled into human affairs, and is given, through
the material practices of inscription and descrip-
tion, meaning. Nature and materiality figure in
this account, and yet despite the will to render the
scene as more than a human affair (and so rescue
nature and the object from a pure cultura), a
suspicion remains that they are not up to much. 
A similar problem exists with a popular device
used in cultural geography entitled the ‘circuit of
culture’ (see Burgess, 1990; Johnson, 1986;
Squire, 1994). The circuit, which focuses analytic
attention on the production and consumption of
landscape meanings, and sees particular cultural
productions (like the landscapes and texts which
Willems-Braun examines) as moments in a broad
process, encourages researchers to engage with
what Johnson (1986) calls ‘acts’ – matters under-
determined by existing textual inscriptions. The
extratextual purity of acts, rather like the extra-
textual qualities of the materials in British
Columbia, is, however, treated as something of a
remainder that is left unexplored in this model of
cultural production and consumption.
This remaindering of extratextual material and
action is, seemingly, less of a problem for those
Marxis-inspired analyses which fill the void with
an account of the social production of landscape.
Drawing on Marxist theories of labour value,
landscape is produced through significatory
practices as well as relations of labour which are
‘embodied in any landscape’ (Mitchell, 1998: 18).
Mitchell, for example, seeks to combine theories
of representation with theories of production in
order to not only peel back layers of accreted
meaning but also ‘excavate the processes, includ-
ing the processes of labour, that went into
producing the actual form of the landscape’
(1998: 21). This, it seems to me, is an eminently
worthwhile project, particularly if the under-
standing of textuality continues to obscure mate-
rialities (although as I have hinted and as I will
argue below, this need not be the case). And,
perhaps more importantly, if it allows for the
recovery of forms of agency that are normally
obscured from landscaping practices. Indeed,
Mitchell’s (1996) writing on migrant workers
and landscape production contributes to a series
of political projects that relate to struggles over
representation. However, Mitchell’s project does
tend to reproduce a subject/object distinction
under another guise. In short, and despite some
protestations to the contrary, Mitchell’s project
ends up, like the historians he criticizes, repro-
ducing a strong division between human and
non-human labour, and ultimately between
cultures and natures. So, for example, when
Mitchell approvingly cites Richard White’s writ-
ing on the production of nature through embod-
ied labour he tends to emphasize the human
labours. In doing so, he misses White’s (1996)
potentially interesting sense of the creativity of
human/non-human relations. What is recovered
from the obfuscation of landscape is a strictly
human sense of agency.
The landscape, whether an English parkland, the view
from an Italian villa, a California farm labour camp, the
plains that constitute Chicago’s hinterland or a Columbia
River fish ladder, is a place structured for someone, by
someone. (Mitchell, 1998: 22, emphasis in original)
There are two problems here. First, an assump-
tion remains that landscapes can be read once
and for all. Whilst the subject/object dichotomy
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re-emerges in admittedly politically useful ways –
as I have accepted, such readings are strategi-
cally useful in terms of re-presenting a silenced
majority – the ideology critique itself is
expressed as a matter beyond worldly practices.
As Whatmore has put it, ‘such accounts share an
inclination to exempt themselves from the repre-
sentational moment, by variously claiming a
privileged correspondence between concept and
object, logic and process’ (1999: 24). Second, in
positing landscapes and power as functions of
the intentionality of historically situated human
subjects, there is a tendency to evacuate land-
scapes-as-lived. In other words, we are paradoxi-
cally left with an anaemic sense of landscape and
agency. Mitchell, of course, should not be
accused of writing bloodless histories and geo-
graphies, but in laying bare the real landscape,
produced through various relations of labour, we
are back to a pre-given order of things in which
it is difficult to reimagine a place for different
human/non-human orders. Despite their eye-
opening quality, Mitchell’s landscapes can be
read as enclosed affairs, whose histories and geo-
graphies seem to follow set trajectories2 (see
Massey, 1999a, for a careful expansion of this
argument with respect to dominant forms of
progressive politics).
To be clear, this is not to deny the importance
of power, fetishization, labour or even ideology
in the production of landscape. Nor is it to empty
the field of political commitment. Rather, it is to
say that current formulations seem to rely upon a
particular politics of representation and a partic-
ular form of inhabitation. In short, there is a
tendency to treat the diversity and coexistence of
non-human worlds as at best a matter of only
passive interest and then in terms which strike
out multiplicity with a universal natural body (in
the form of transformations from first nature to
second nature, or even to third nature: see Luke,
1996; and see Whatmore, 1999, for a critique). In
the second half of this chapter I want to work
towards another sense of landscape, one that can




So how do we avoid the natural or cultural deter-
minism that seems to follow on from some of the
work that I have reviewed so far? How can non-
human spaces be imagined and engaged without
making them timeless and spaceless abstrac-
tions? How can we avoid centring landscape
meaning and value on certain humans and/or on
humans alone? In this section I attempt to find
some partial answers to such questions by push-
ing at what might be involved in inhabiting land-
scapes successfully. To be clear, the inhabitation
that I want to push is not as cosy as it might at
first sound. As I stated at the outset, there is no
clear blueprint with which we can fall in line, no
harmony to which we can adjust. Things are more
dynamic than this adjustment model suggests
(see Botkin, 1990; Zimmerer, 1994). For one
thing, inhabiting human and non-human land-
scapes will produce changes to all parties (albeit
to varying levels and to different degrees). And,
as I stated at the outset, all landscape assemblages
will remain somewhat out of joint. This is not a
sense of inhabitation that can hope to cover all
bases and produce a blanketed landscape which is
reducible to one logic or schema. In this sense,
landscape inhabitation will involve interrelations,
but not necessarily interdependency.
In order to develop this sense of a connected
though differentiated landscape, I want to
explore the degree to which understanding land-
scaping as textual practice can reinvigorate a
politics of inhabitation. The focus on textuality
may seem counter-intuitive, especially given the
tendency in recent cultural geography to talk of
materialities, bodies, non-humans and so on as
non- or extratextual matters. But, as I have
argued, such a boundary drawing exercise is too
quick and risks too much, especially if we are
left more or less where we started, with an albeit
deferred split between nature and culture (some-
thing that seems to me to be endemic in the
tectonic and semiotic approaches that I have so
far reviewed). The point of the argument here is
to suggest that whilst there may be good reasons
for being suspicious of textual models, it is nev-
ertheless politically and intellectually important
to avoid old pitfalls. So, before engaging with
some of the main approaches that I have identi-
fied for developing a politics of landscape inhab-
itation, I want to make two points. First, rather
than arguing for less text, textualities can actually
be pursued for the work they do in producing an
inhabitable and affective world. Second, there is
a need to specify a little further what kinds of
activities or practices are understood as textual. 
Let me start with this reversal of the normal
objection to cultural geography’s treatment of
landscapes and natures. We need more rather
than less text. The normal objection, particularly
from some forms of Marxist analyses and from
environmentalists, is that we need less about
texts and more about worlds. So, for example, in
using the circuit of culture, analysts come across
moments, or desire to find moments, when some-
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thing or some process is outside the inscribing
and de-scribing of text – moments that are
‘underdetermined’ by the current intertextual
setup. I have hinted above that I am sympathetic
to such an approach, and am similarly suspicious
of anything that imagines the world is con-
structed, and interpreted, by humans, for humans
and through linguistic constructions alone (what
Whatmore rightly criticizes as the all too preva-
lent ‘lexical cast of the cultural turn’, 1999: 29).
However, as Latour (2001) has noted, as soon as
the phrase ‘underdetermined’ is used, there is a
tendency to revert to a task of allocating between
what humans say and what the rest of the world
does. The aim therefore in the second half of this
chapter is to refuse such an analytical process. So
rather than looking for things that exist outside
texts, the aim becomes one of gaining under-
standing of how texts (perhaps amongst other
means) can enable what Latour calls a ‘learning
to be affected’. For Latour, the inscribing and
describing activities of laboratory science and
field science are not only productive of knowl-
edgeable scientists. Learning to be affected is
also a matter of engaging with a world that
becomes more highly differentiated as under-
standing proceeds. This is not, it should be clear,
a matter of simply becoming attuned to a pre-
existing world (an explanation that simply
reassembles the old binaries) but is a means
through which humans and non-humans can add
to the world. So, when Latour describes the
textualization of smell through odour kits in the
perfume industry, and the progressive refinement
of testers’ ability to differentiate fragrances, he
notes how ‘body parts are progressively acquired
at the same time that world counter-parts are
being registered in a new way’ (2001: 2). Further,
he argues that this is not simply a means by
which testers find words to refer to the world.
This would be the zero-sum game that many
associate with the textual representation, or more
accurately the linguistic capture, of the world.
Rather, in learning to be affected – in articulating
propositions – bodies, things and words all have
the potential to become more than they were
before the articulations began. So, for the socio-
logists of science,
the pair human–nonhuman does not involve a tug-of-
war between two opposite forces. On the contrary, the
more activity there is from one, the more activity there
is from the other. (Latour, 1999b: 147)
In other words, this kind of account moves away
from texts as representatives and towards a sense
of texts as habits, and as means to make connec-
tions. In doing this we unsettle the common
belief that human subjects are knowledgeable
and (non-human) objects constitute simply what
is known (or waiting to be known). The relation-
ship is less one-sided. So, for example, when
Hayles argues that a species extinction ‘reduces
the sum total knowledge about the world’ (1995:
58), this is not because the living organisms that
belong to that species are no longer available for
study, but because ‘it removes from the chorus of
experience some of the voices articulating its
[the world’s] richness and variety’ 1995: 58; see
also Abram, 1996, for an attempt to convert this
phenomenology of the senses to an environmen-
tal ethics, and my reservations of this project in
the conclusion to the chapter).
This brings me to the second point. The model
of text that I am starting to evoke here is perhaps
a useful qualification to the one that Curt refers
to (that of interpenetration), but it is certainly dif-
ferent to the one that cultural geography has, in
the main, inherited from cultural and literary
studies. It is a version of textuality that engages
and enlivens the world rather than swamps it.
The feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz marks a
significant distinction between a closed and
overcoded textual model that she associates with
a Derridean understanding of textuality, and one
that is more characteristic, she argues, of
Deleuze’s open sense of textual activity. It is the
latter, I will argue, that offers resources for
inhabiting landscapes (see also Davies, 1999).
Instead of a Derridean model of the text as textile, as
interweaving – which produces a closed, striated space
of intense overcodings, a fully semiotized model of tex-
tuality – a model that is gaining considerable force in
architectural and urbanist discourses, texts could, more
in keeping with Deleuze, be read, used, as modes of
effectivity and action which, at their best, scatter thoughts
and images into different linkages or new alignments
without necessarily destroying their materiality. Ideally,
they produce unexpected intensities, peculiar sites of
indifference, new connections with other objects and
thus generate affective and conceptual transformations
that problematize, challenge, and move beyond existing
intellectual and pragmatic frameworks. (Grosz, 1995:
126–7)
As I will hope to show, taking this latter sense of
textuality along with Latour’s affective bodies
provides possibilities for extending some of
Latour’s interest in largely human schemata and
world-making activities (albeit ones that rely on
activities of non-humans), and takes us some
way to developing transhuman geographies. As I
will also suggest, it will be necessary to draw out
what Latour’s affected world and Grosz’ link-
ages and alignments involve in order to situate
this textual model in the landscape politics that I
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want to pursue here. For now, the idea that we
need more rather than fewes texts (or articulations
of propositions) in order to become affected, and
that we should understand texts as actions that can
but do not of necessity produce connections,
together form the basis for thinking some more
about landscapes, nature and inhabitation.
In the following subsections I use the sugges-
tive framework provided by Grosz and Latour to
introduce and then to qualify what might be
involved in a material semiotic approach to
inhabiting landscapes. The focus here will be on
the limitations to an overly analytical approach
to semiotics and so in the final subsection I draw
out what an experimental or connective semi-
otics, more in line with Grosz’ textual model,
might involve.
Material semiotics
‘Material semiotics’ is employed to great effect
in the writings of Latour, Haraway and others
(see Akrich and Latour, 1992, for a useful intro-
duction and Haraway, 1992, for an exposition).
The term is used to emphasize that, far from
being limited to the feared, pure cultura, mean-
ing is just as much about material arrangements
as it is about words on a page. For Whatmore, for
example, material semiotics is a means to extend
‘the register of semiotics beyond its traditional
concern with signification as linguistic ordering,
to all kinds of unspeakable “message bearers”
and material processes, such as technical
devices, instruments and graphics, and bodily
capacities, habits and skills’ (1999: 29). Material
semiotics concentrates attention on the ways that
stable meanings are built out of a wide range of
actions and actants. The attraction to those in
technoscience studies who have until recently
been interested in the ways in which stable
orders (like scientific truths and technological
efficiencies) are produced is clear. Worlds are
built through the more or less successful linking
together of other worlds, and the longer and
more robust the linkages, the more stable the
construction (although see Munro, 1997, and
Hinchliffe, 2000a, for criticisms of this equation
of length and strength).
In terms of understanding landscapes, we start
to open out a geography of networked relations.
In these terms, landscapes are no longer simply
human affairs (a reading based upon a funda-
mental division between subject and object).
Material semiotics most significantly enables a
recognition of human and non-human times and
spaces and their roles in the co-constitution of
worlds. This approach:
recognizes chains of translation of varying kinds and
lengths which weave sound, vision, gesture and scent
through all manner of bodies, elements, instruments
and artefacts – so that the distinction between being
present and being represented no longer exhausts, or
makes sense of, the compass and possibility of social
conduct. (Whatmore, 1999: 30)
Material semiotics, networks and weaving prac-
tices are all important to the politics of inhabita-
tion. They start to enliven understandings of the
importance of non-human and human acts in the
making of worlds (and the spatialities that are
implied in those activities). Likewise, they start
to unsettle divisions between presence and
absence and start to suggest a degree of openness
to practice. Nevertheless, this openness is not
always apparent in the growing body of work
that calls itself actor network theory (ANT).
Indeed, there is a danger (by no means inherent,
but, given the way a good deal of actor network
theory, in particular, has been operationalized –
see the criticisms of Lee and Brown, 1994, and
Law, 1999a – a real danger) that some of the
more structural and totalizing elements of a
semiotic approach can re-emerge in analysis (in
Grosz’ terms, this is in part the risk of a fully
semiotized model of textuality).
Part of the problem may well be the route
through which material semiotics has come to
this area of geography. Haraway, Latour and
Akrich all adopted the approach and terminology
of A.J. Greimas (including his deployment of the
term ‘actant’). As Lenoir points out, Greimas’
semiotics is ‘an abstracting, ahistorical, struc-
turalist semiotics aimed at looking for a logic of
culture, proposing a structural explanation in
terms of systems’ (1994: 122), and even reduc-
ing textuality to deep biological structures. To be
sure, Haraway’s ‘coyote grammar of the world’
is very different to Greimas’ ontology. But
Lenoir worries that her adoption of numerous
elements of his work, including ‘actors, actants,
narratives and the semiotic square’ (1994: 132),
requires a more stringent demonstration of how
we can avoid his structural determinism.
Like Lenoir, I take it that the aim of engaging
with semiotics is to avoid ‘grids of actantial roles
and thematic functions … [and] arid formalism’
(1994: 136). Rather, it is to foreground the acci-
dents and contingencies, the embodied and situa-
ted activities, as well as the consistencies and
regularities, that make landscapes. To this end,
the resident network topology of material semi-
otics is either being treated in more self-
evidently open ways, emphasizing its active,
practical (and therefore far from complete) usage
in the verb ‘to network’ (see Whatmore, 1999),
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or being supplemented with other topologies.
The point is to open analyses to those aspects of
landscaping and other forms of ordering that are
not so managerial and totalizing and which
demonstrate awareness of the non-presences as
well as the presences in landscapes. Examples
include Mol and Law’s (1994) use of fluid meta-
phors; Law’s (1999b) interest in fire; Latour’s
(1999a) actant rhizomes; Haraway’s (1994;
1997) game of cat’s cradle; and Hetherington
and Lee’s (2000) blank spaces. All can be
considered as attempts to abandon that tendency
of actor network theory to be the final word (see
Lee and Brown, 1994, for one of the first state-
ments to this effect).
There are, in other words, various means to
imagine ways of allowing a space for alterity in
landscaping practices. Such spaces are necessary
if we are to avoid some of the overinscription and
overconfidence of, say, landscape semiotics or
Marxist analyses. Meanwhile, even though some
of this excitement has been generated through
ANT’s own, belated, preoccupations and troubles
(compared say to feminist and poststructuralist
engagements with alterity), Hetherington and Lee
(2000) suggest that the totalizing tendency of
social theory is more widespread. They suggest
that the current ‘relational turn’ in geographical
writing is in danger of inhabiting a similar politi-
cal space to earlier versions of ANT. For exam-
ple, relational theory tends to assume ‘that all
elements, regardless of their apparent ontological
status, are open to being related one with another’
(2000: 173). Hetherington and Lee argue that
although relational theory manages to move away
from human-centred versions of social theory,
and thereby provides a basis for countering an
‘ontology of division’ (2000: 174) (between, say,
human subjects and non-human objects), it does
so only by constructing another, similarly con-
straining, ontology. For, in asserting that all
elements may potentially be related, a commonal-
ity is supposed, ‘in which all actants share a sus-
ceptibility to force, a susceptibility which provides
the grounds on which they can become related to
one another” (2000: 173–4). For Hetherington and
Lee, then, a residual sameness remains in rela-
tional geographies. Despite its talk of openness,
difference and the possibility for change (change
which is not part of some predestined future: see
Allen, 1999), the initial commonality, an ontol-
ogy of force, makes ‘it hard to see why there
should be change at all’ 2000: 174). In sum, we
need to move away from ‘a readiness to be
ordered by virtue of shared human qualities [an
ontology of division] or readiness to be related
through human/nonhuman susceptibilities [an
ontology of force]’ (2000: 174). Instead,
the question of social order has changed from a question
of shared properties or susceptibility to relation into a
question of how relation may be forged at all. 2000: 175)
The answer to such a question lies, for Hethering-
ton and Lee and for the philosopher Michel
Serres, in a different semiotics where it is not only
present elements which contribute to the building
of landscapes of order. There is something other
to the ensuing order which escapes characteriza-
tion as a necessary element of that order, but
which nevertheless does not necessarily exist
outside the order (and therefore does not need to
be brought ‘in’ through a conventional represen-
tational politics). These others, which are consti-
tutionally indifferent to their placement in an
order, and which can perform stabilization as
well as change within an order (the authors use
jokers in a game of cards, the figure zero in
maths and angels as exemplars of this facility),
are termed blank figures. Rather than represent-
ing the absence of presence in a landscape or
order, blank figures do just the opposite. They
are figures that are present absences. They are,
the authors argue, absolutely vital to the process
of ordering, but they are not easily dragged into
an economy of representational signs. Mean-
while, their unearthliness is perhaps one way
(although as I will suggest in the final subsection,
not the only way) of rescuing landscape studies
from a metaphysics of presence, and in particu-
lar, of earthly (land-locked) and territorial pres-
ences (a trait that Irigaray, 1997, associates with
a peculiarly masculinist and romanticist
approach to space, place and landscape; see also
Thrift, 1999).
Now, despite their claims, Hetherington and
Lee’s notion bears a strong resemblance to the
politics of difference that is at the heart of some
versions of relational geography. It seems to me
that, for example, Massey’s power geometries do
not boil down to an ontology of force. Indeed,
without using the same language, Massey does
insist on supplementing relationality with an
openness to just the kind of surprise and uncer-
tainty that intrigue Hetherington and Lee:
The relationality of space together with its openness
means that space also always contains a degree of the
unexpected, the unpredictable. As well as the loose
ends then, space also always contains an element of
‘chaos’ (of the not already prescribed by the system).
It is a ‘chaos’ which results from those happenstance
juxtapositions, those accidental separations, the often
paradoxical character of geographical configurations
in which, precisely, a number of distinct trajectories
interweave and, sometimes, interact. Space, in other
words, is inherently ‘disrupted’. (1999b: 37, emphasis
added)
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Together, Massey, Hetherington and Lee provide
important reminders of the limits to representa-
tional politics. Landscape politics cannot simply
be concerned with finding and drawing in the
missing masses, for there will always be an
unexpected component to the practical conduct
of ordering or making space. The difference is
that Massey draws us into this political realiza-
tion without recourse to a set of what might be
read as unworldly and politically indifferent
figures. As I argue in the final subsection, this
sense of practical contingency (even within the
most successful of ordering regimes) helps to
flesh out what might be involved in a politics of
landscape inhabitation.
Experiments and connections
I have now sketched examples of attempts to
maintain a sense of alterity in accounts of the
ordering of worlds. For a politics of inhabitation
and nature, this seems attractive. It is just that
sense of surprise and strangeness, even, as
Haraway has suggested, that ‘independent sense of
humour’ (1991: 199), which is required for a posi-
tive inhabitation of landscape (see Figure 10.2).
And yet, to a certain extent, these reimaginings
of textualities remain in many cases concerned
with a particular style of inhabitation. They are
concerned with building. Indeed, from tectonics
(the study of how form is built), to semiotics (the
study of how meaning is built) – and then to
textualities of various kinds – the concern has
ostensibly been to account for the construction
of worlds. And even with the attempt to allow
room for alterity, and thereby to avoid a crude
representational politics, the building metaphor
remains.
The problem is that holding onto a building
metaphor runs the risk of returning to an admit-
tedly more elaborate, knowing, academic gaze.
Or to put this another way, whilst the figurations
and elements of landscape may be changing, the
form of knowing can seem to stay remarkably
constant (see Hinchliffe, 2000b). Perhaps this is
nothing more than a risk in Hetherington and
Lee’s work. Certainly they frequently remind
readers that the project is not one of representing
the formerly underrepresented. And there can be
little doubt that these geographies start to open
up possibilities for new connections and creati-
vity. However, there seems to be a difference
between building alterity into an account of the
world, and accepting alterity as part of ongoing
practice and changing our knowing practices to
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adopt what Deleuze characterized as a ‘looser
kind of sense’ (Rajchman, 2000: 8). The most
important lesson here is that, despite talk of inde-
terminacy and contingency, more work needs
to be done if we are to stem the tendency to
re-inscribe the division between intellectual and
other forms of practice (what Napier has called
the ‘disconnected intellectual excitement’, 1992:
65, that can be produced as we give life to
mysterious objects).3 One means of doing so is to
take seriously a Deleuzian model of textuality
which is, from the outset, oriented to active
experimentation, and labours under no illusion of
passive accounting.
Indeed, Deleuze’s empiricism involves a
rejection of any philosophical moves that require
the mystical, the invisible or the absent as a
means to critique conventional knowledge or
thinking (Rajchman, 2000: 18). Following
Whitehead, Deleuze sought the conditions under
which something new is produced by ‘putting
one’s trust not in some transendence or Urdoxa,
but rather in the world from which thinking
derives and in which it becomes effective’ (2000:
45). This is not to say that in dispensing with
blankness, angels or other mystical figures, we
are left with a straightforwardly knowable world
(see Massey’s point above). Indeed, the aim is
not to know a world in which, in any case, ‘vir-
tual elements move too quickly for conscious
inspection or close third person explanation’
(Connolly, 1999: 24; see also Thrift, 2000b).
What is crucial, and what angels and blanks can
fail to underline, is the requirement to surrender
some of the analytical baggage and experiment:
to produce, in other words, ‘a semiotics that
would be diagrammatic or cartographic rather
than symbolic or iconic, and diagnostic of other
possibilities rather than predictive or explana-
tory’ (Rajchman, 2000: 67).
In short, a shift in ways of knowing is being
advocated, from a ‘knowing what’ to a ‘know-
how’ (or, in Latour’s terms, a ‘learning to be
affected’). As Thrift’s (1996; 1999; 2000a)
characterization of what he has termed a non-
representational turn in intellectual labour has
suggested, Deleuze, Latour and Grosz are not
alone in urging for a shift away from attempts to
match worlds and words. Likewise, there is a
whole raft of work in feminist studies (see Grosz,
1995; Probyn, 1996), psychology (Bateson,
1973; Newman and Holzman, 1997; Shotter,
1993) and philosophy and neurobiology
(Connolly, 1999; Varela, 1999) which urges us
to do something other than provide accounts of
the ways in which worlds are ordered or built.
Nevertheless, and at the risk of closing too much
down at this stage, let me mark out some of the
experimentalism that interested Deleuze from
some of the other ways in which the building
metaphor of social theory has been disclaimed.
Drawing on Heidegger’s essay, ‘Building,
dwelling, thinking’ (1971: 145–61), the anthro-
pologist Ingold counterposes dwelling to ‘build-
ing’, as a means to highlight the notion that far
from confronting the world (head on), humans
live in amongst the world:
the forms that people build, whether in the imagination
or on the ground, arise within the current of their
involved activity, in the specific relational contexts of
their practical engagement with their surroundings …
In short, people do not import their ideas, plans or
mental representations into the world, since that very
world, to borrow a phrase from Merleau-Ponty (1962:
24), is the homeland of their thoughts. Only because
they already dwell therein can they think the thoughts
they do. (1995: 76)
Ingold manages to unsettle any crude, cogni-
tively based, distinction between human and
non-human living forms by bringing to the fore
the ongoing, practical engagements (and disen-
gagements), contingencies and know-how that
make living possible (see also Ingold, 2000).
Humans, like many others, ‘act to think’ rather
than think in order to act (see Thrift, 1999: 297).
And yet, despite what is certainly an attractive
means of reimagining landscape practices, there
is a sense in which Ingold risks a rather ‘earthly’
romanticism by emphasizing the territorial qual-
ities of ‘dwelling’ (not to mention ‘homeland’:
see Thrift, 1999). In some ways, we are back to
humans living and dwelling ‘in’ a landscape,
which itself risks becoming ahistorical and, more
importantly, ageographical. Indeed, it is the
localism of these dwelt landscapes that remains
problematic in this work. It is important, there-
fore, that dwelling does not become a means of
returning to locality-based and ‘presentist’
senses of landscape and place. (See also
Mitchell, 2001, on the dangers of mistaking land-
scapes as solely local achievements.)
Perhaps even more significantly, it is the com-
bination of Heideggerian dwelling with Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of lifeworld that tends, despite
claiming that Cartesian ontological priorities are
being reversed (Ingold, 2000: 169), to reinstall
human transcendence and so open up the old
fault lines between humans and the rest. For
Deleuze and Guattari, there is a piety in Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology which runs just this kind
of risk (1994: 178). As Rajchman summarizes
Deleuze’s suspicions: 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh still harbours a
strange piety, tied with a dream of an originary experi-
ence or Urdoxa … On the other hand the ‘being of
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sensation’ that one extracts from common perceptions
and personalized affects, or from the space of repre-
sentation and the re-identification of objects, leads
not to an intersubjective orientation in the world, but
rather to a mad zone of indetermination and experi-
mentation from which new connections may emerge.
(2000: 8–9)
Another way of expressing this distinction is to
highlight the quality of becoming in Deleuze’s
philosophy, as opposed to an orientation to
being that is present in much phenomenological
work (and which certainly comes to the fore in
environmentalist attempts to articulate phenome-
nological work: see Abram, 1996).
In sum, the active textualities that are involved
in making landscapes, in this Deleuzian sense,
are experimental rather than analytical. Like-
wise, they are about ongoing and active engage-
ment and connections/separations rather than
cold and distant visions. And, furthermore, in
being actively engaged, they are careful not to
filter these engagements through phenomenolog-
ical (pre)conditions: nothing, it is argued, need
remain unchanged. This means that we need to
learn to put our trust in the world which not only
makes thought, but also makes thought effective.
I want to finish by drawing out some of the




The first implication bears upon the ways in
which human bodies and embodiments are
thought and practised. There is a good deal here
that is shared with the literature that speaks of
embodied vision and which attempts to resensi-
tize seeing by recasting it as bodily, sensuous
experience. Seeing is never untouched by the
sights and sites of vision. It is haptic and, in that
sense, moving (see Taussig, 1993). But, it is
important to add, embodying vision is not a
simple matter of adding a ready-made human
body to the eye or to the I of the subject. As
Thrift has endeavoured to make clear, this is an
embodiment which is certainly not fixed (and
nor is it in any sense a reference to an essential
body), but it is a process that incorporates a
range of specific competences:
This is, then, an embodiment which is folded into the
world by virtue of the passions of the five senses and
constant, concrete attunements to particular practices,
which always involve highly attuned bodily stances as
bodies move in relation to each other; ways of walking,
standing, sitting, pushing, pulling, throwing, catching,
each with its own cultural resources. (1999: 314)
The specifics (and the species) are important. It
is right to say that being incorporated in a differ-
ent body would be to live a different world
(Hayles, 1995: 56). This is exactly what Latour’s
(2001) ‘learning to be affected’ attempts to
evoke. As bodies (and presumably not just
human bodies) engage with the world, so body
parts and worldly counterparts are gained. It is
important to clarify, therefore, that body
specifics are far from being closed matters.
Rather in the manner of Deleuze’s suspicions
surrounding phenomenology, there is a risk of
returning to an ontology of division, based this
time not on superior cognition or linguistic abil-
ities but on embodied competence (see Callon
and Law, 1995, for a review of the means
through which speciesism is justified). Such a
risk is, however, a problem only when the pur-
pose of social science and of cultural geography
remains exclusively analytical (continuing to
ask, for example, what a body is, rather than
working out what a body can do: see Probyn,
1996: 41). When embodiment is regarded as a
practical and ongoing achievement, or even a
political/ethical positioning, then we can return
to interaction – but without a preordained notion
of the boundaries that mark the interactants. This
is, then, a different sense of interaction than the
one that I attributed to landscape tectonics. This
is a sense of natural and cultural difference with-
out walls, a way of abandoning the foundational
cartographies of autonomous political subjectiv-
ities without reducing the world to indifference
(see also Whatmore, 1997). This is a possible
opening for the deferral of natures which aren’t
universal, preordained, but which do maintain
the capability to be different.
The second implication follows on from this
argument. Non-human spaces are unlikely to be
circumscribed by human actions (let alone
thoughts). Nor do they exist ‘out there’, waiting
to be re-presented in here. A more practical
orientation would be to acknowledge that attempts
to engage non-human spaces will always be
marked by imperfect articulations, and will be
matters out of joint. As Latour (2001) has skil-
fully demonstrated, non-human spaces can
become entangled one moment only to develop,
through their dynamic sociability, other kinds
of spaces in the next. This has been particularly
evident in modern industrial-agricultural food
landscapes (see Whatmore, 1997) and in the risk
landscapes marked by superconductive events
(Clark, 1997). In everyday landscape practices,
non-humans often object to the stories and roles
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that have been set for them (with disastrous
results: see Hinchliffe, 2001, on the BSE crisis).
The challenge for intellectual and political prac-
tice has been and will be to learn how to allow
non-humans (along with those humans who are
more used to being silent objects) to object more
frequently in those settings that are not accus-
tomed to other-than-human ingenuity. This, it
should be stressed, is not a matter of representa-
tion, but is more akin to dialogical engagement
(although without the sense that such engage-
ment need necessarily lead to a consensus or
agreement: see Mouffe, 2000). Achieving this
sensibility requires the looser kind of sensing
that was mentioned earlier, a building up of
know-how and a learning to be affected. 
The final issue is ethics. In landscape move-
ments that have been largely informed by a politics
of representation, the aim has often been to bring
in the missing masses (the nature, the human
labourers) or to reveal the artifice of social
power. Environmentalists in particular have been
keen in recent years to represent various absentees
from landscape contests (including non-humans
and the yet to be born). Once represented, the
new political subjects can take part (even if
remotely and through their spokespeople) in the
deliberation over means and ends. Whilst it
hasn’t been the aim of this chapter to undermine
such representational strategies, the argument
has started to suggest that a politics of inhabita-
tion may need to realize the limits to (and even
what Deleuze called4 the indignity of) speaking
for and of others. This is in part because the
complexities of living make such neat spatial
encoding of self and other problematic (see
Whatmore, 1997). It is also because, as Varela
(1999) has made clear, representational politics
tends to forget that most of our lived lives are
characterized by skilled behaviours and practical
ethical expertise rather than abstract ethical
deliberations. A similar point is made by Abrams
in his careful construction of environmentalist
ethics, although a certain piety and sense of pri-
mordial nature is retained in this phenomenologi-
cal excursion. Likewise, as the segmentations of
the natural and the social become ever more
difficult to sustain, so the idea of drawing up a
‘natural contract’ becomes more and more diffi-
cult to imagine (a problem that Serres’ 1995
argument only partially resolves). Taking these
points together starts to underline the Deleuzian
injunction which is to ‘go beyond our social
identities and see society as experiment rather
than contract’ (Rajchman, 2000: 20).
The danger here is that a reasoning, abstract
Cartesian subject can disappear only to be replaced
by an equally abstract desiring, experimental,
individual (human) ethical agent (see Whatmore,
1997: 40). Such an imagination obscures ‘the
conditionality of dialogic engagement in terms of
the mundane business of living’ (1997: 40). It is
these landscapes of the living that provide some-
thing like the distributed sense of agency, the
sense of interrelatedness and partial dependencies,
and the more experimental and diagnostic ‘arts of
connection’ which break free from the entrenched
cartographies of conventional, bounded, landscapes
(territories, neighbourhoods, bodies, regions: see
Whatmore, 1997). In this sense, inhabiting land-
scape requires an experimental geography,
which works from landscapes as lived, and seeks
to develop progressive forms of inhabitation
through practical engagements. In terms of
ethics, extension of concern derives from land-
scape practices and engagements – which, it
should be stressed, proceed from the practical
skills of landscaping and not from deliberation or
the production of universal rules. Thus, ‘the very
relation of intellectuals to such “movements” or
“processes of subjectivizations” must change,
passing from a “representational” to an “experi-
mental” role, freeing the “social imagination”
from the representation of anything given, prior,
original’ (Rajchman, 2000: 101). 
The trajectory I have taken through tectonics
and semiotics to connections has enabled me, on
the face of it, to remove a hyphen from the
language of nature politics. In actual fact the
hyphen is very probably irrelevant. What is
important is the shift from a deferral to first
nature (or for that matter to second nature), to a
deferring and differing of natures. The latter takes
us beyond a liberal democratic project of repre-
sentation. To where is less easy to communicate,
although the ordinariness of living with natures
suggests that there are more resources for inhabit-
ing the landscapes of nature than we are perhaps
prone to recognize. I take it that it is a task for
cultural geography to engage with the everyday
practices of animal, plant and geophysical natures,
with all their geographical complexity, in order to
recover what those resources are and how they
might be instructive of other possibilities. With-
out, of course, seeking to have the final word.
NOTES
Thanks to Sarah Whatmore and my Open University
colleagues for providing a number of challenging
interventions in the writing of this.
1 By geographically and historically specific I don’t
mean to suggest that the spatiality and temporality of
this way of seeing is easily located somewhere or
periodized as some time (e.g. the modern period in
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Europe). Indeed, geographies of seeing are rarely so
bounded or neat: for an interesting cross- and transcul-
tural approach to seeing landscapes, see Hirsch and
O’Hanlon (1995).
2 Olwig's ‘more substantive understanding of landscape’
(1996: 631) is similarly an attractive and rich account
of landscape semiotics which provides resources for
avoiding a narrow focus on lexical issues, but he does-
n't, it seems to me, escape the charges that I have made
here. See also Olwig (1993).
3 Rose’s warning, cited earlier, that the ‘textual
metaphor aims to stabilize disruptions and demon-
strate learning and sensitivity’ (1993: 101) could, it
seems to me, just as easily be levelled at the more
recent attempts to ‘allow for’ alterity.
4 Quoted from a conversation with Foucault. Cited in
Rajchman (2000: 97).
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